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Abstract: The ‘democratising’ function that the liberal theory assigned 
to the media is under suspicion because it is neither evident nor factual that 
the main goal of the media is geared towards contributing to fulfil demo-
cratic ideals. Nowadays, the media operate as an industry with ad hoc 
interests, which are far away from the role that liberalism once ascribed 
to it, and despite this, the ideas of truth, right to information and freedom 
of expression are still interpreted with inherited concepts from liberal 
theory. This paper argues that there is a need to reinterpret the democra-
tising role of the media. In so doing, it delves into two contrasting under-
standings of democratic life: Richard Rorty’s liberal irony and Jürgen 
Habermas’s communicative action. The article contends that the theory 
of communicative action embraces specific notions and definitions, which 
are necessary to give an adequate and responsible response to the ever 
demanding task that legitimises the media: that of providing the citizens 
with pertinent and significant information to live in a society.
Keywords: truth, justification, irony, contingency, media ethics, com-
municative action, pragmatism, democracy, validity claims, right to in-
formation.
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PATIENTS’ DIRECT ACCESS TO 
THEIR ELECTRONIC MEDICAL 
RECORD USING THE INTERNET: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Marie C. Leroy a & Michel Dupuis b
Abstract: Patient-accessible medical record is an important element of evolution in the 
patient-physician relationship: patients want to become more active in their health care pro-
cess. We want to highlight the results of studies that analyse the impact of patients having 
access to their electronic medical record using the Internet on patients, on physicians and on 
their relationship. The studies were identified using “Pub Med” and “Web of Knowledge”. 
The search was limited to articles published between 2000 and October 2012. We focused 
on articles about patients accessing, through Internet, their electronic medical record that are 
created and filled in by physicians. 26 studies were selected and analysed. Quantitative data 
were obtained through questionnaires, analysis of the log-ins and analysis of the records, while 
qualitative data were obtained through interviews and focus groups. The specificity of our 
review refers to the electronic means through which patients access their electronic medical 
(and particularly Internet).
Keywords: Electronic medical record, Patients access, Internet, physician-patient rela-
tionship, health knowledge, communication, autonomy.
INTRODUCTION
Patient-accessible medical record is part of a wider movement of changes in the patient-
physician relationship. Nowadays, patients want to become more active in their healthcare 
process: they want to be informed about their health status and participate in the decision-
making process. The electronic medical record (EMR) is now widely used and Internet allows 
patients to access it when and how they want. 
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RICHARD RORTY’S PRAGMATIC PROPOSAL
Richard Rorty believes in hope as a claim and a goal that mobilises 
social dynamics. His suggestion is based on the experience of hope-based 
“philosophy” in the USA. Rorty explains that, according to the fathers 
of pragmatism, James and Dewey, this would mean a North Ameri-
canisation of philosophy, for, in his view, the USA are the country that 
only has the future to support its reason and justification. Besides, he 
considers national pride as a necessary condition for self-improvement. 
Hilary Putnam established the essence of pragmatism as the primacy of 
the practical over the theoretical –what she has called the primacy of the 
agent point of view. Rorty believes in his country’s democratic experience, 
as well as in what he defines an experimental, promising, progressive state 
of mind prevailing in the USA. Moreover, he shares this view with John 
Dewey and Walt Whitman. The latter contends “…because the United 
States is the first country founded in the hope of a new kind of human 
fraternity, it would be the place where the promise of the ages would first 
be realized ” (Rorty, 1998:22). Like several Americans, Rorty is thus 
proud of the legacy left by the country’s founding fathers to the USA 
democracy. 
Rorty’s democratic project is defined along the following axes (Curcó, 
2007): 
1. A compendium of the Enlightenment values without their meta-
physical weight.
2. Opposition to essentialism. 
3. A pluralist society with democracy, solidarity and tolerance. 
The citizen of this democratic project is a liberal citizen, defined as the 
citizen who is aware of his placement in history and from this placement 
can discern in his practices a potential of universality, yet not their neces-
sity of being universal. Rorty rejects the necessity of universalising prac-
tices, of considering something as human nature or of a univocal concept 
of truth. He questions the belief of the existence of Truth in the sense of 
something not made by human hands, something which has authority 
over human beings (Rorty, 1998:27). For this reason he suggests that 
truth cannot be important for democratic politics and he urges this citizen 
to adhere to justification. He argues that democratic politics can be de-
fended, at the same time as three premises are rejected: a) there is only 
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one truth and the universal interest in it provides us with a reason to 
create an inclusivist community, b) truth is a correspondence with real-
ity and c) reality has an intrinsic nature (Rorty & Habermas, 2007). In 
connection with the above, he rejects the need for a theory of knowledge 
that works like a cultural base, and the idea of keeping philosophy as 
something “rigorous” or “scientific” (Rorty, 1990).
In the next section there is a short presentation of the concepts 
related to Richard Rorty’s democratic project, in order to be able to 




Rorty asserts that in order to understand the human being, one has to 
do it from the point of view of contingency, not of necessity or of sub-
stantiality, i.e. he accepts that the ego, as well as reality and our explana-
tions of it, could be different. Contingency points out that thinking about 
something beyond what we are able to understand right now in a spe-
cific context is senselers. This is why considering reality as something 
existing out there, independently of the person that can describe it, a 
supreme being or a transcendental ego, can only limit and confuse people. 
Rorty explains that Dewey’s philosophy is a systematic attempt to tem-
poralize everything, thereby leaving nothing fixed. This means abandon-
ing the attempt to find a theoretical frame of reference to evaluate propos-
als for the human future. The price of this temporalization is contin-
gency (Rorty, 1998: 20-23). So he prefers historicism and contextualism 
and urges us not to seek depter or significance in events; on the contrary, 
we should try to understand them within their context as cultural events. 
Just like habits, moral concepts, such as for example justice, are con-
tingent and depend on a particular place and time. The individual is his-
torical contingency and depends on the provisional agreement about 
which attitudes are normal and which practices are fair or unfair. 
Irony, Ironist, Liberal Ironist
Irony is a quality of people, citizens, which makes them feel a radical 
detachment from themselves (Rorty, 1989). This detachment occurs 
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precisely because the ego is contingent. Rorty adds that to some extent 
irony has an epistemological character, because it connects the subject to 
its Final Vocabulary1 or to fundamental values of its culture. Therefore 
he goes as far as to say that irony has an ethical character. 
He states that in order to be an ironist a person has to meet three 
conditions:
1. To have radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary 
one uses, precisely because having been in contact with other vo-
cabularies makes one constantly doubt. 
2. To realise that one’s own final vocabulary can neither clarify nor 
confirm or resolve these doubts. 
3. Insofar as somebody philosophises about their situation, they do 
not think that their vocabulary is closer to reality than others or 
that it is in touch with a different reality. An ironist only confronts 
vocabularies in order to confront the old with the new, this is his 
only interest (Rorty, 1989).
The Liberal Ironist is a citizen that includes among the desires that 
cannot have foundations his own hopes that suffering diminishes and that 
human humiliation caused by others ceases. For, according to Rorty, the 
only expectation one can have is to diminish the cruelty towards and the 
suffering of others, and the Liberal Ironist is committed to this, while at 
the same time understands the contingency of his own commitment. 
Solidarity
Solidarity is what people have to aspire to living in a society. It does 
not depend on the participation of a common truth or a common goal but 
on sharing a common selfish hope: the hope that one’s own world will 
not be destroyed. Rorty (1989) develops this idea taking it to the moral 
level and says saying that people have the moral obligation to experience 
a feeling of solidarity towards all the other human beings. His approach 
is based on the doctrine according to which moral obligation is “we-inten-
tions” as explained by Wilfrid Sellars. The moral force comes from feeling 
part of a group, i.e. thinking in terms of “one of us” has more force than 
1 Rorty defines Final Vocabulary as: “…a set of words which they employ to 
justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives.” Cf. Rorty 1989, p. 73.
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thinking about somebody as “people like us”. The feeling of solidarity is 
strengthened when we consider that the one with whom we declare soli-
darity is “one of us”, while “us” includes almost the entire human species.
Truth
Rorty’s suggestion disregards truth, for once it is obtained it cannot 
be recognised. Nevertheless, we do realise it when we find ourselves before 
a justification. One can recognise an appropriate justification but not a 
precise truth; one does not know if a belief is true in absolute terms, 
however nobody can formulate an objection against it (Curcó, 2007). 
Objective truth, if it is possible to speak in these terms, is no more and 
no less than the best idea we currently have about how to explain what 
is going on (Rorty, 1990: 385). Objective truth is thus tied to his own 
idea about cultural anthropology. 
For Rorty, pragmatism dissolves and dismantles the traditional prob-
lem of truth by suggesting that truth has no explanatory use but the 
following uses: a) Warrant or support, b) Warning in observations such 
as “your belief in S is completely justified but it might not be true” (Rorty, 
1991:127– 128) and c) Diverging reference in order to say metalinguistic 
things such as “S is true only if….”. He rejects the idea of truth being a 
universal desire (Rorty, 2000), a common claim, as well as the idea of 
truth having a specific correspondence with reality and of reality having 
an intrinsic nature. 
In addition, it is possible to appreciate the pragmatic influence in 
Rorty’s concept of truth: “…the achievement of Dewey’s philosophy 
was to treat evaluative terms such as ‘true’ and ‘right’ not as signifying 
a relation to some antecedently existing thing –such as God’s Will, or 
Moral Law, or the Intrinsic Nature of Objective Reality– but as expres-
sions of satisfaction at having found a solution to a problem: a problem 
which may someday seem obsolete, and a satisfaction which may 
someday seem misplaced” (Rorty, 1998:28).
“The error is to assume that ‘true’ needs a definition” (Rorty, 
1991:127), a maxim that warns of the need to distinguish between the 
statement that “the world is out there” and the one that “truth is out 
there”. To say that the world is out there means that most of the things 
in space and time are the effects of causes that do not include human 
mental states. While, according to Rorty, truth is not out there, because 
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it cannot exist independently of the human mind: where there are no 
propositions there is no truth, propositions are elements of the human 
language and these elements are human creations. The world is out there, 
but the description of the world is not, therefore only the descriptions of 
the world can be true or false. 
In his democratic suggestion, Rorty links truth with life in society as 
a part of free discussion (Rorty, 1989: 84): 
“From our angle, all that matters for liberal politics is the widely shared 
conviction that, as I said in Chapter 3, we shall call ‘true’ or ‘good’ what-
ever is the outcome of free discussion –that if we take care of political 
freedom, truth and goodness will take care of themselves”.
The Priority of Democracy over Philosophy 
Rorty defines democracy as a free exchange of opinions that does not 
result in or necessarily has to result in a universal agreement. At the same 
time, he criticizes the position of particular pretensions regarding phi-
losophy, i.e. that of judging other areas of culture on the basis of its 
special knowledge about the “foundations” of these areas (Rorty, 1990: 
8). He explains that as citizens we can be as indifferent to the philo-
sophical disagreements on the nature of the ego as Jefferson was to the 
theological differences on the nature of God (Rorty, 1991). In both 
cases it is a matter of beliefs that have to remain private. Every one of us 
is the soveraign of our private realm, where everything can happen. 
Nonetheless, understanding philosophy as an explanation of the existing 
relations between a particular order and human nature is irrelevant for 
political democracy; this is why Rorty concludes that “when the two 
come into conflict, democracy takes precedence over philosophy” (Rorty, 
1991:192).
Having verified that one cannot get convincing and practical answers 
from philosophy when it comes to guiding social relations, he suggests that 
it should be democracy, as a method of obtaining concrete agreements, 
the one that guides relations in society. In this sense, consensus is a task, a 
goal, but it cannot be considered a presupposition of intercultural dialogue. 
On Rorty’s account, consensus is not the starting point, it is the finish 
line. The emphasis of Rorty’s project is on hope that unites citizens, it is 
bound to the citizens’ ironic attitude –a product of verification and ex-
perimentation of constant contingency– and shared vocabularies. Thus he 
argues that “The idea that liberal societies are bound together by philo-
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sophical beliefs seems to me to be ludicrous. What binds societies to-
gether are common vocabularies and common hopes” (Rorty, 1989: 86).
THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN RORTY’S PHILOSOPHY
Our question to Rorty has to do with the role of mass media in a 
technocracy, i.e. in democracies subject to the constant changes of infor-
mation societies and the technology entailed. On the one hand, mass 
media can be a part of the system, following the dictates of the market 
within the communications industry, and on the other hand, it can have 
a critical role and a role of active defence of democracy. Rorty opts for 
the second one because he believes that mass media were transmitting 
stories about the pain that can generate solidarity between citizens.
In Rorty’s picture, mass media as a democratic institution are defined 
as tools justified by the success they have when they promote the demo-
cratic purposes we want to achieve. If the way of achieving this “success” 
is not defined, there is the risk of them becoming just another source of 
entertainment. And this is not what Rorty suggests; what he suggests is 
a reformulation of how the media carry out their function for demo-
cratic life. 
Rorty’s suggestion has to do with Irony and, as already stated, he even 
attributes an ethical character to Irony, and by doing this he is providing 
foundations, leaving an aspect outside contingency. If we let Irony be the 
citizen’s quality that governs, for instance the mass media function, could 
the mass media inform of things that are not true? Could they stop doing 
it? One could say that the media inform of things that are not true and, 
by doing this, they misinform the citizens, but the difference is that Rorty 
does not consider this significant. Or maybe he does? Rorty takes the 
actual Irony seriously. Maybe Rorty, without realising it, suggested a 
project with much more foundations than he would have liked. 
Rorty dismisses the needto talk about truth in social dialogue, as well 
as to consider it the aim of the investigation, for the investigation should 
only aim at solving problems, convincing audiences and/or achieving our 
goals. He rejects the epistemology understood as the search for certainties 
to cling to. At the same time, he refutes the attempt of philosophy to 
constitute itself in a tribunal of reason (Rorty, 1990: 166). In his opinion, 
the question is not whether human knowledge has foundations, but 
whether it makes sense to suggest that it does (Rorty, 1990: 178).
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However, journalism has a value inasmuch as it narrates other people’s 
pain, which reinforces –or at least it should– the expectation of solidar-
ity and permits the identification with the others. Moreover, the media, 
among other institutions such as the judiciary, elections, or universities, 
are a space favourable for free discussion (Rorty, 1989). However, truth 
is not the aim of the mass media work. 
Rorty acknowledges the task of the media to narrate the pain experi-
enced by others (Rorty, 2002), and, although a vast range of people offer 
this kind of descriptions (journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novel-
ists, film directors, painters), he prefers novels and articles and newspaper 
columns as ideal spaces to find them. The usefulness of this kind of writ-
ings is to make types of pain visible, so that one can get over them. If we 
avoid pain, solidarity shall awaken and we shall achieve hope. Liberal 
ironists shall get to know this pain through the narratives they are given, 
but how should this narrative be? Does it not matter whether it is offered 
by an ethnographer, a writer or a journalist? Is it the same if the narrative 
is given in a university, through a book or every day through the mass 
media? Is there a method that favours this narrative? How do we measure 
the effectiveness, the success of these narratives, if we consider them 
democratic institutions? 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS’S COMMUNICATIVE PROPOSAL
Habermas’s suggestion falls within the context of Critical Modernity 
developed in the Frankfurt School in the 20th century, which rejects the 
instrumentalist shift tacitly produced by the enlightened reasoning and, 
instead, favours moral reasoning as a key to make history (Cortina, 2000). 
An enormous difference between Habermas and the original ideas of the 
Frankfurt School is that, whereas some of its principal exponents, such 
as Adorno and Horkheimer, considered that the world suffered from 
excessive reason, Habermas considers it is rather a matter of lack of its 
application and, in order to explain this point, he develops his Discourse 
Ethics. The work of the prolific writers of the Frankfurt School sought, 
through criticising modernity, not only to provide a theoretical sugges-
tion, but also a driving force of change (Velasco, 2003). 
In the next section there is a short presentation of the axes along which 
Habermas develops his suggestion, which shall enable to  understand the 
role of mass media it entails. 
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CONCEPTUAL AXES
Communicative Action and Validity Claims 
Habermas explains that there are different kinds of actions depending 
on their orientation: actions oriented to reaching understanding and actions 
oriented to success. Among the actions oriented to success there are the 
instrumental actions, oriented to success in non-social contexts, and the 
strategic actions, also oriented to success but within social contexts. He 
develops his theory based on those actions that are oriented to reaching 
understanding, to seeking consensus and to the way of achieving it. Among 
them there is the communicative action. Habermas (Habermas, 2001 
a:124) defines it as the search for understanding amongst actors, who seek 
to coordinate the action. The interpretation is crucial as it bridges the 
various definitions of the negotiative situation susceptible of consensus. 
Habermas states that the action situation is a field of current needs of 
understanding and of current possibilities of action (Habermas, 2001 
b:175) and that the consensus achievable through intersubjective recogni-
tion of the validity claims can be measured (Habermas, 1991). According 
to Habermas, one can distinguish two “types” of validity claims. On the 
one hand, there are the validity claims of the actual act of communication 
(intelligibility, truth, veracity and honesty), which are transcendental and 
implicit in communication. This means that, when one of them is ac-
cepted, all of them are accepted; otherwise, the rejection of one or an-
other validity claim has to be declared.2 
On the other hand, Habermas also refers to the validity claim which 
aspires to reach a norm, i.e. its content. Having met the claims of the act 
of communication itself, which are a condition of acceptance of the norm 
on behalf of the people involved, the content of the norm has to be the 
object of consent of everybody involved. This is why it is crucial to reach 
understanding, which is the mechanism coordinating the action and de-
pending on the rational approval and on the acceptance of the speech act 
on behalf of the hearer. 
The conception of language changes depending on the type of action: 
in teleological actions, language is conceived as one more means of influ-
encing according to one’s own purposes. In normative actions, language 
2 For a critique regarding the influence of Kant in Habermas in connection with 
the expectations of validity and the consequent relation established between truth and 
justification, Cf: Bernstein, 2010.
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is a means of transportation of consensus (cultural values) ratified in 
every new act of understanding. Language in dramaturgical action is a 
means of presentation of self. In the case of communicative action, it 
presupposes language as a means of understanding without any abbrevia-
tions, from the pre-interpreted horizon his world represents, simultane-
ously with something in the objective world, in the social world and in 
the subjective world, in order to negotiate definitions of the situation that 
can be shared by everybody (Habermas, 2001 a:137). 
There are two aspects of language that Habermas deals with: first of 
all, the fact that language is the only rational medium for getting to know 
reality and, therefore, a condition of possibility of knowledge. Secondly, 
that language is in its original form, when it tries to reach understanding, 
not when it tries to achieve other goals. 
When actions are oriented to reaching understanding, the actor takes 
for granted, even if it is in an implicit way, four validity claims, namely: 
1. Comprehensibility or intelligibility: good expression.
2. Veracity or authenticity: making oneself clear in the presentation 
of subjective experiences (Habermas, 2001 a).
3. Propositional truth: presenting in an understandable manner 
something that exists with the claim to represent facts. 
4. Honesty or normative correction: the content expressed has to 
adjust to a specific normative context socially recognisable as valid. 
 
Each validity claim alludes to a different reality: the objective world, 
the social world or the subjective world: the objective world is the total-
ity of all entities about which real utterances are possible; the social world 
is the totality of all legitimately regulated interpersonal relations; and the 
subjective world consists of the totality of the speaker’s experiences, to 
which he has privileged access. And each one of these worlds is related 
to a specific validity claim: the claim of truth refers to something in the 
objective world, the claim of honesty refers to something in the social 
world and the claim of veracity refers to something in the subjective world 
(Habermas, 1991). 
The three worlds are a framework for interpretation within which 
common definitions of an action situation are produced. In the case of 
the claims of propositional truth and the claims of honesty or normative 
correction, the speaker can comply with the guarantee by discursive 
means, i.e. reasoning. In the case of the claim of sincerity, it shall be 
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through congruent behaviour that the actor will account for the expressed 
guarantee, given the fact that somebody really believes what they are 
saying only if it can be proven with acts. 
Although propositional truth and normative correction are the claims 
that can be achieved by discursive means, they coordinate the action in a 
different way. Speech actions behave differently in the case of events and 
in the case of rules. Habermas puts it this way: A moral norm has sense 
and validity independently of whether it has been promulgated and is 
used in one or another sense. However, there is no assertive utterance 
that can achieve autonomy of norms unless it is through a speech act 
(Habermas, 1991: 80). The claims of truth lie only in speech actions3, 
the claims of normative validity in principle lie in norms and they only 
lie in speech actions in an indirect way (Habermas, 1991). 
This is why it is so important to distinguish between the social fact of 
intersubjective recognition and the claim of a rule to recognition. A 
positive entry into the force of norms is not enough to assure their long-
term social validity. One can easily see this by observing what happened 
at different moments in history and in different countries throughout the 
world with laws that were promulgated under dictatorships: they are in 
force but not valid. 
The Habermasian proposal goes all the way to the field of communi-
cative action: the ground of ethics. Habermas explains that the justification 
of norms, unlike the justification of utterances, is a communicative mat-
ter, and it is not so by chance but for essential reasons: “The question 
whether a controversial norm is equally good for all the people involved 
is something that can be decided according to pragmatic rules in the 
form of a real discourse” (Habermas, 1991: 90). The communicative 
model proposed by Habermas lays emphasis on the role of language and 
the role of understanding. Language is significant only from a pragmatic 
point of view, when speakers establish relationships with the world and 
they do it in a reflective way. Understanding works like a mechanism 
that coordinates action. This means that the participants in the interaction 
agree upon the validity they expect, because they intersubjectively recog-
nise the validity claims with which they present themselves to each other 
(Habermas, 2001 a). 
3 For a critical approach to Habermas’s work on the theory of speech acts, as well 
as the answer of Habermas to critical comments on his own approach, Cfr: Thompson, 
J.B. & Held, D, 1982, p. 130 y p. 271-273, respectively. 
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Speech Act
The coordinated action that seeks understanding is expressed through 
speech acts. Following Austin’s theory, Habermas recognises three ele-
ments in the speech act:
1. Locutionary act: the content of declarative sentences (´p) or of 
nominalised declarative sentences (that ´p´). With these actions 
the speaker expresses the state of things, he says something about 
them. 
2. Illocutionary act: the agent performs an action by saying something 
(for instance, a statement, a promise, an order or a confession). 
The illocutionary aim the speaker is trying to achieve comes from 
the actual meaning of the utterance, so its communicative intention 
is complete if the other party understands. 
3. Perlocutionary act: the speaker wants to have an effect on the 
hearer. The perlocutionary aim is not followed by the content; it 
can only be determined by verifying the agent’s intention. Thus, 
the description of perlocutionary effects has to refer to a context 
of teleological action that goes beyond the actual speech act (Haber-
mas, 2001 a). 
Moreover, there is a correspondence between the three components 
of the speech act and knowledge, obligations and expression (Habermas, 
2001 b). Speech acts are means in which understanding happens and they 
can be used for the following purposes:
1. To establish and renew interpersonal relationships in which the 
speaker refers to something that belongs to the world of legitimate 
regulations. 
2. To present or presuppose states or facts, when the speaker refers 
to the world. 
3. To present experiences, i.e. the presentation the subject makes of 
itself by a reference to its subjective world (Habermas, 2001 a). 
Communicative action seeks illocutionary aims, not perlocutionary 
ones, given that the latter ones can only be known once the speaker’s 
intentions are known and they cannot be obtained by the actual utterance 
content. Hence for communicative action, only the speech acts to which 
the speaker relates claims of validity subject to critique can be considered 
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decisive, (Habermas 2001 b: 391). This way, the situations in which the 
speaker seeks undeclared aims with perlocutionary acts are excluded. The 
same goes for the case in which the speaker seeks illocutionary aims before 
which the hearer cannot take a stand based on reasons, such as the im-
peratives. Aiming exclusively at perlocutionary acts can cause different 
kinds of distortions, as well as asymmetries detrimental to the search of 
consensus. Habermas explains that, whereas in teleological, normative 
and dramaturgical action one only emphasises one function of language 
(causing perlocutionary effects, establishing interpersonal relationships 
and expressing experiences), communicative action takes into considera-
tion all of the language functions. 
Ideal Speech Situation
The ideal speech situation is a theoretical model of approach to com-
municative interactions that represents a distortion-free communication. 
It consists in the fact that communication is freely performed and on equal 
terms with no coercion other than the best argument.4 As a theoretical 
construction it is useful, for it allows us to explain and understand the 
theory of communicative action. However, we should keep in mind that 
for Habermas this is not a goal of communication. The goal is reaching 
understanding and the means is the coordination of the action between 
two or more linguistically competent actors. 
Discourse Ethics
What Discourse Ethics suggest is an extension of the Theory of Com-
municative Action towards the moral field (Cortina, 2000): it does not 
provide content orientations; it is a process full of assumptions that seeks 
to guarantee impartiality in the formation of a judgment. Its method is 
practical discourse, in the sense of a process of verification of the validity 
of rules uttered in a hypothetical manner (Habermas, 1991). So by exten-
sion, moral thinking also aims at resolving conflicts of action through 
communicative means in order to achieve agreements. Its process is in-
tersubjective; therefore, the task of foundation-building depends on the 
real discourses between human beings. This way, all metaphysical a 
4 For some critiques of the role of the best argument: Cfr: Hesse, 1995 and Rorty 
& Habermas, 2007.
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priori elements are rejected, given that everything starts and ends in a 
human praxis. 
Discourse Ethics uses the discursive principle of universalisation (“U”) 
as a principal criterion of moral evaluation: the proposal is universal, 
because with the foundations of “U”, the fundamental assumption of 
ethical relativism is rejected. Habermas explains that in the same way 
theoretical discourse eliminates the rift between particular observations 
and general hypotheses trough induction, practical discourse needs a bridge 
principle. This moral principle takes the form of a norm of argumentation 
and carries out a function that is equivalent to induction. He defines it 
this way: a moral principle that excludes as invalid these norms that do 
not get the qualified approval of all possible recipients, (Habermas, 1991: 
83 and 142). 
For Discourse Ethics, a norm can only aspire to validity when every-
body involved can manage to achieve an agreement (or is able to achieve 
an agreement) in which such a rule is valid: this is the postulate of Discourse 
Ethics “D”, which presupposes that the selection of norms can have 
foundations. Discourse Ethics has, therefore, two assumptions: 
1. Claims of normative validity have a cognitive sense and they can 
be dealt with as claims of truth. 
2. Foundation norms and orders require the performance of a real 
discourse which is not a monologue.
Habermas warns of the importance of distinguishing the principle of 
universalisation “U” –rule of argumentation–, from the postulate of 
Discourse Ethics “D”, which makes the claim clear. Otherwise, the at-
tempts to provide foundations for Discourse Ethics are weakened, for 
the rules of argumentation are confused with their contents, and the as-
sumptions are confused with moral principles as foundations of philo-
sophical ethics. 
The discourse proposed by Habermas has a number of rules tacitly 
accepted and intuitively acknowledged, through the use of the method of 
philosophy –transcendental reflection– and by application of the factum 
of argumentation. Therefore, consensus is established in a discursive man-
ner (Habermas, 1991). Thus, Ethics is placed within the framework of 
universal pragmatics, which conceives the use of language oriented to 
reaching understanding as the original use of language (Habermas, 2001) 
and seeks to identify and construct the possible universal conditions of 
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understanding. He believes language is a means of this understanding and, 
therefore, the principal element for the coordination of human action. 
This is why the possible understanding conditions coincide with the 
universal assumptions of communicative action. 
THE ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA IN HABERMAS’S WRITINGS
The definition of truth given by Habermas makes the work of mass 
media possible, because it recognises the possibility of presenting real or 
false events, so it admits the possibility to inform or not. On the other 
hand, it does not take into account the concept of correspondence that 
has marred journalists’ work, because it is so easy to abdicate truth when 
it comes to something unachievable or maybe even non-existent. Moreo-
ver, it is a definition of truth that takes into account processes and rules 
of the game that can become a compass when it comes to providing in-
formation. 
In the same way, the distinction made by Habermas between entry 
into force and validity allows us to understand the modern functioning 
of mass media. The entry into force of a use –a regulation, a law, etc. – 
has to do with a coercive force (social or legal), while validity has to do 
with legitimacy. In the case of mass media, both are required: on the one 
hand, the democratic function of the media has to be valid, and on the 
other the professional work of journalists has to follow certain rules, so 
that in case of transgressions there will be a coercive force that sanctions. 
Before the moral discourse limitations –taking for granted that there 
are or there could be such limitations– it is necessary to introduce pro-
cesses for correcting the ones related to facticity. In the meanwhile, valid-
ity of norms has to derive from a dialogue that combines the interests of 
the interested parties. In the case of mass media, Habermas’s distinction 
between entry into force and validity allows us to combine the interests 
of the citizens that trust that their right to be informed in the best way 
shall be met with the interests of the journalists for doing their job well 
and with the interests of the company that has to survive financially but 
whose original concept has to meet the information obligation. 
Habermas sees democracy as a field and ground of practical use of 
reason. Moreover, he has been critical towards the role of mass media as 
these have contributed to the progressive dissolution of the concept of 
public opinion (Habermas, 1981). In this light, Habermas does not deny 
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that the mass media can act as catalysts of forming public opinion, if they 
are true to their democratic function5. 
JUSTIFICATION OR TRUTH IN MASS MEDIA:  
A HABERMASIAN PERSPECTIVE
The model proposed by Jürgen Habermas seems more propitious for 
re-legitimisation of the democratising role of the mass media6 given that 
Habermas acknowledges a normative function of mass media. His 
model is rational and cognitive and, according to it, understanding is 
achievable given the existence of interpretative contexts (common horizon) 
while it appeals to a universal background. It is the way Habermas sees 
language and the social importance of the coordination of actions that 
make his proposal an opportune framework for an ethical proposal for 
mass media in nowadays societies. 
As it is a deontological perspective, it permits reconsidering the 
principles orienting the professional action and revitalising the demo-
cratic function of mass media. From this point of view, it is important 
5 Nicholas Garnham explains the basic critiques and the virtues of Habermas’s 
notion of public sphere as far as mass media are concerned, emphasising on the con-
nection between pluralistic political project, media and public sphere. Cf. Garnham, 
1992: 360, 361and 372.
6 This article deals with the differences between Rorty and Habermas with regard 
to these aspects that seem relevant to legitimacy of the democratising function of mass 
media in modern societies. However, given the huge range of Habermas’s work and 
the importance of the subjects he dealt with, he has inspired many critical works from 
different perspectives. Some of them: regarding the theory of the public sphere (Cohen, 
1989; Dryzek, 1990; Frishkin 1991; Calhoun (Ed.) 1992; Peters, 1993; Thompson, 
1995; Page, 1996; Phillips, 1996; Buckingham, 1997; Shudson 1997, Hass 2004), 
regarding the possible contribution of discourse ethics to mass media (Calhoun (Ed.) 
1992; Keane, 1991; Scanell 1998), regarding the theory of Habermas in connection 
with the work of mass media under the paradigm of public or civil journalisms (An-
derson, Dardenne & Kilenberg, 1997; Glasser & Bowers, 1999; Hass 1999), regard-
ing the pragmatic proposal and its aim of investigating general competencies required 
for a correct performance of speech acts (Thompson & Held (Ed.) 1982, on the force 
of the best argument (Hesse, 1995), ideal conditions of truth and separation between 
theory and practice (Bernstein, 2010). 
A particularly interesting work is Thompson and Held’s (1982), editors of a 
compendium of critiques of various matters including a chapter in which Habermas 
answers to his critics.
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for the assumptions of Discourse Ethics to have a claim of normative 
validity, because, if they do, there is also the possibility to guide 
journalists’ work in mass media. The fact that norms have dialogue 
foundations is crucial, for dialogue creates a commitment and if there 
is a commitment, there is also responsibility. Rorty does not see “the 
pragmatic force” of saying that an argument that, like most of them, 
convinces certain people and not others is a good argument (Rorty 
& Habermas, 2007). In contrast, Rorty believes that the pragmatic 
base of his proposal should understand truth as that which is better 
for us to believe in (Rorty, 1990: 10). With Habermas the force of 
the best argument lies in the fact that it makes coordination of the 
action possible. 
THE DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT
Rorty defines the democratic institutions as tools that are justified by 
the success they can have when democratic purposes are promoted, with-
out explaining who is it that defines these purposes or the success achieved 
and how this success is determined. In the particular case of mass media 
for example, would it be enough to have a wide covering? I.e. is it enough 
if a great number of people can have access to them? According to Rorty, 
mass media would “work” as successful tools, but he does not explain 
what kind of success that would be, nor does he study in depth the features 
and implications of their democratising role. 
Rorty acknowledges the mass media’s task of narrating the pain other 
people have experienced, so that we can approach hope and try to avoid 
what we share, i.e. pain, by means of identification. This means that he 
attributes a function to mass media, even though he does not explain why 
do they have that function, neither does he attribute to mass media rel-
evance for the foundations of such a role. But given that mass media any 
have to inform of true facts, that the existence of mass media is valid 
because of the social function attributed to therm by the liberal theory, 
and that all this results in a responsibility from which they cannot be 
detached –neither mass media nor journalists–, this role requires founda-
tions. And these foundations are found in communicative action, because 
communicative action seeks understanding in the social context and re-
quires a role of language and truths under critical thought. Habermas’s 
acknowledgment of democracy and the way of understanding the delib-
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erative processes that exist in democracy, offers the possibility of recon-
sidering the legitimacy of mass media work in modern democratic socie-
ties.
Just like democracy has its foundations due to the communicative 
action, given that the latter one seeks social agreement, it also where mass 
media foundations lie. This is why, according to Habermas’s paradigm, 
the possibility of foundation-building and re-moralising mass media brings 
about not only the mass media functioning, but also the quality of de-
mocracy. 
CONTEXTUALISM OR LIFEWORLD 
The mass media should take into consideration various contexts 
when they inform: they have to transmit interpreted facts, having 
considered references to other facts and to their possible consequences. 
Of course the information is transmitted from a particular context, but 
this does not prevent the journalist from considering there are others 
as well. Otherwise, complicated situations might come up, such as ex-
cluding points of view, opinions or different attitudes, which would 
question the activity of mass media. In this sense, the way Rorty un-
derstands contextualism can reduce the possibilities of interpretation of 
facts of which the mass media wish to inform to some very culturally 
defined elements7. 
This is why Habermas’s lifeworld seems more appropriate, in the sense 
of an unquestioned substratum that allows reaching understanding: it is 
a background from which we act and interpret actions –our own or 
other people’s– and from which existing situations can be problematised. 
Even if there is no common background –in the case of two people from 
different cultures for example– Habermas acknowledges the possibility 
of communication, because there is –not de facto, but there can be– an 
existential opening to communication.8 Rorty, on the other hand, abdi-
7 Rorty himself clearly explains the distance between those two in comparison with 
the truth: the American philosopher believes that when the distinction between justi-
fication and truth has been explained, there cannot be much more to say about truth, 
while Habermas believes that there is a lot more to be said and that doing it is impor-
tant for democratic politics. Cf: Rorty & Habermas, 2007.
8 In his words, the intersubjectivity of reaching understanding substitutes the ob-
jectivity of experience (mentalistic perspective). Cf: Rorty & Habermas, 2007.
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cates the possibility of understanding if it is not shared in the same context. 
This, besides limiting the possibilities of understanding, it entails a risk, 
because globalisation and immigration present a picture that makes peo-
ple communicate with others from different cultural and geographical 
contexts. While Rorty criticises the belief that building an epistemology 
should consist in finding the maximum common ground with others 
(Rorty, 1990: 316), he is not considering that even without the intention 
to find the common ground, such common ground exists and thereby 
allows communication. Moreover, such common ground exists prior to 
the establishing communication while allowing such an understanding, 
which is a fundamental condition of possibility in Habermas’s  proposal. 
On the other hand, Rorty believes that in practice it is not important 
to pose the question of whether our common assertions are universal or 
they depend on the context (Rorty & Habermas, 2007), according to 
him. With regard to this distinction, Habermas suggests something that 
can be more important in practice: the tension between facticity and 
validity. However, it seems that Rorty and Habermas do not mean the 
same thing when they talk about practice: Rorty’s proposal alludes to the 
utility in everyday life, while Habermas refers to the lifeworld, for it is 
there that decisions are made in contrast to discourse or theory. 
TRUTH OR JUSTIFICATION? THE ROLE OF TRUTH9
Habermas attributes value to the concept of truth, he tries to define 
it and this is of great value because the mass media cannot do without it, 
given that truth is a condition of information. Rorty agrees with Haber-
mas on the point that the only general foundations of the criterion of 
truth we can have areb those that refer to a distortion-free communication. 
However, Rorty believes that one cannot say much about this distortion-
9 In Sobre la verdad: ¿validez universal o justificación?, it is made clear that what 
creates the biggest difference between them is precisely the matter of truth. Rorty 
emphasises the role of truth in democratic politics, fallibilism, universality versus 
context, performative contradiction, the best argument and the necessity of a theory 
of rationality. On the other hand, Habermas takes up again some of these subjects: 
contextualism, fallibilism, justification and truth, language and speech acts, as well as 
the necessity of certainties in everyday practice. Finally Rorty gives an end to their 
dialogue by claiming the elements that create the distance between them, truth and 
justification.
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free communication except that it is the communication achieved when 
there are democratic political institutions and the conditions to make 
these institutions work. Habermas asserts that there is much more to say 
(Rorty 1989): besides recognising it as a condition of the possibility of 
free discussion, he explains that it has to be a symmetrical, public com-
munication with no coercion whatsoever except for the one of the best 
argument, among other things. 
Since that mass media have to inform of facts and since there is the 
problem of the possibility of access to truth, it seems more appropriate 
to think along with Habermas there shall be arguments, interpretations 
or justifications that will be constantly checked, while a better argument 
can arise for debate with the original one.10 This way, besides the pos-
sibility of a debate and of not believing that “Truth” is a possession of 
one or of a small group of people, there is a mechanism of constant 
contrasting. 
On the other hand, Rorty and Habermas understand Justification 
in different ways: while Rorty states that it has to do with what can be 
used at a particular moment and place –this is why he acknowledges 
some historical norms of acceptability–, for Habermas Justification 
means exclusively that the parties involved have good reasons to choose 
a common form of action (Habermas, 1991: 96). It is not a substitute 
for truth; it is what makes a speaker prefer certain reasons or others 
when he presents arguments. While Habermas defines truth as the result 
of the communicative process and as a universal claim of validity previ-
ous to all kinds of communicative process, Rorty does not consider it 
the result of a process; he relates it to language contingency, rejecting 
a use of truth as foundations or explanation. According to Habermas, 
the connection between truth and justification11 explains why we can 
talk about a claim of unconditional truth that aims beyond what is 
justified. It is not the right representation of reality that is in stake, but 
the everyday practices that should not collapse. The assumption of an 
objective world independent of our descriptions meets a functional 
requirement of our processes of cooperation and communication. 
Without this assumption, daily practices would break down, (Rorty & 
Habermas, 2007: 108-109). 
10 He also says that all knowledge is fallible and when it has been problematised it 
will depend on justification. Cf: Rorty & Habermas, 2007.
11 For a critical approach of this relation Cf. Bernstein, 2010.
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Some of the arguments Rorty gives in favour of Justification, which 
are to the detriment of the mass media function, are the following:
1. Mass media give information and narrate facts. If we only have 
Justifications, there would be an implicit reduction or elimination 
of space for informing of facts (the hard facts, as in the journalistic 
jargon), thus limiting the space to beliefs, opinions, interpretation 
or entertainment. And in our complex societies both are necessary 
to make a decision, informing of facts and opinions or interpreta-
tions about them. 
2. Rorty explains that if we want to discurs a difference to be wor-
thy, this difference has to have some importance in the practical 
sphere. Horwever, who is it that decides whether a difference 
has importance in the practical sphere? Who is it that defines the 
practical sphere in various contexts or situations and how? Who 
or what is it that acts as an “invisible moderator”, when it comes 
to evaluating differences? Particularly in considering that the 
relevance of practice in Rorty is connected with the problem’s 
solutions.
3. He adds that the only difference of this sort –that has consequenc-
es in the practical sphere– that exists between truth and justification 
is the difference between former and newer audiences (Rorty, 2000: 
88); i.e. the difference between the conditional character of justifi-
cation versus the unconditional character of truth and the price 
one has to pay for the unconditionality is the price of practical lack 
of importance. However, if we consider the mass media work, it 
is the contrary that takes place: the information shall be such and 
shall be of service to the function of democracy, only if it is true. 
If somebody informs that the maximum temperature today will 
be 10ºC and it ends up that the maximum temperature is 3ºC, 
there is a practical lack of importance precisely because of the 
conditionality of the information. How do we make decisions, if 
we do not have the appropriate information? How many times 
have we heard people complaining precisely about the lack of 
precision, appropriateness, truth of the information we read, see 
and/or hear from the mass media? The journalistic information 
loses practical importance if it is not reliable, if it is not uncondi-
tional, if it is not true. We cannot survive only with suppositions 
in everyday life (Rorty & Habermas, 2007). 
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4. Rorty says that the use of warning of truth is the only one we 
cannot easily do without, when there is a warning that a belief can 
be justified and not be true. But we can easily refute it, on the one 
hand: how can Rorty get to know it is not true? And on the 
other hand, what happens, when we wish to talk about the truth 
of the narration of a fact and not of a belief?12 One of the risks the 
journalistic work in mass media entails is precisely to fill newspa-
pers, the news, radio programmes or Internet pages with beliefs or 
personal opinions that are very well justified without providing 
narrations of true facts. 
5. According to Rorty, the assertions that can be made, by exten-
sion, the information that can be transmitted, depend on their 
possibility of justification before a particular audience. He does 
not even consider it important to wander about the existence of 
certain assertions that could have a validity that goes beyond the 
context of the audience in question. He claims that believing that 
an assertion depends on the context or it is universal does not 
have any kind of practical significance (Rorty, 2000). There are 
occasions when this difference has a practical significance, such 
as when is a law is passed. On the other hand, there is also sig-
nificance, when it comes to defining the functioning of mass 
media in democracy. The functioning of mass media that derives 
from Rorty’s pragmatic proposal does not seem solid enough to 
sustain the citizens’ right to be informed nor to be part of the 
democratic mechanism. Moreover, since according to Rorty, to 
consider that something as inalienable rights is a cultural construc-
tion and as such it belongs in each and every context, the lack of 
freedom of the press and information not being considered a right 
in some countries would be something absolutely legitimate, as 
it is the result of the current culture13. 
12 Habermas is right when he explains that convictions have a different role in 
action than in discourse and they also prove their truth in a different way. In everyday 
practice, facing the world makes us see whether convictions “work” or they are prob-
lematised, while in argumentation they merely depend on the reasons given. Rorty 
does not agree that there are these two levels, because he considers that rational discourse 
is one more field of action. To study this Cf: Rorty & Habermas, 2007, p. 130 and 
p. 147.
13 It would be interesting to know how Rorty would resolve the dilemma given 
in situations where countries whose population –at least a part of it– does consider 
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MASS MEDIA FUNCTIONING
The role that would correspond to mass media in Rorty’s perspective 
is not very clear or could be described as lax, depending on one’s point 
of view. But it is nonetheless deficient, if we consider that mass media are 
a part of democracy. Rorty seems to neglect the linkage between the 
‘right’ purpose of functioning of mass media and that of democracy. In 
other words, Rorty ignores whether democracy should benefit from the 
fact that mass media does its work in the right way and vice versa.
Rorty considers mass media as ‘transmitters of others’ narratives about 
pain which could generate solidarity amongst citizens. However, this 
results insufficient when attempting to justify the mass media’s role in 
current democratic contexts, particularly if considering that the mass 
media’s function is also contingent. Moreover it is worth asking whether 
Rorty would deem such narratives relevant, particularly when the pain 
described by mass media has already been experienced by someone. 
It is deficient, because, as we have already stated, it does not take into 
consideration one of the conditions of information –truth–, and also 
because it does not take into consideration the idea of the aims of the 
professions with a particular ethos, neither does it take into account a 
concept of responsibility in the case of the journalist’s profession. As 
Rorty does not differentiate the role of journalists from that of anthro-
pologists or filmmakers, etc.,14 he exempts journalists –even more– from 
responsibility, who appear to be exclusively devoted to deliver these types 
of descriptions. Devoting oneself professionally to a particular activity 
implies professional responsibility. For instance, with the arrival of the 
internet and the multiplication of the forms of retrieving information, 
one can access information and opinions through bloggers, individuals 
who are not journalists but create descriptions and opinions that could 
potentially enrich social dialogue. However, such proliferation of voices 
does not equal the responsibility –ethical or juridical– of those profes-
sionally dedicated to spread information. Moreover, by giving the novel 
a prominent role as the space capable of generating debate and dialogue 
that freedom of the press and the right to be informed are a part of its culture, while 
their presidents or ruling parties and their supporters do not agree.
14 The goal of this description is not to be a faithful portrait of reality. Rorty says 
that they have an important role in the conception of moral identity. Cfr. Rorty, R: 
Achieving our country. Harvard University Press, London, 1998, p. 12.
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about social theory, one could be tempted to confuse the role of the 
media role with that of entertainment in the best case scenario, or cam-
ouflaging both roles in the worst of them. 
What motivates Habermas’s project is seeking foundation elements, 
while Rorty’s proposal is based on how to organise social life after having 
renounced them. For Habermas, the aim of social communication is 
understanding, while for Rorty it is giving hopeful narratives, and this is 
neither enough to legitimate the democratic function of the media nor to 
give a moral framework to the profession of journalism. The liberal ironist 
has to criticise in order to open horizons of hope; therefore, the work of 
journalists is one of irony. The big difference is that Habermas considers 
a supreme criterion, some ultimate concepts: the expectance of validity 
and the involved parties’ consent. This is ultimate, non-hypothetical, it 
is a condition of possibility so that there can be a framework of circum-
stances. 
But irony also has game rules. Rorty abdicates the expectance of valid-
ity. Is it possible not to take seriously the conditions of possibility of 
irony? Doing this is ultimate, in a certain way it also means providing 
foundations. So there seems to be a logical contradiction in not wanting 
to consider ultimate concepts. There are occasions in which reality asks 
for an explanation in a way we cannot simply stay in contingency: neither 
the journalist that informs, nor the media transmitting the information, 
nor the citizen who is informed. 
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